This study argues that public infrastructure is an important though previously neglected driving mechanism of the structural transformation. To quantitatively assess its signicance we rst develop a multisector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous rms, where public infrastructure contributes to rms' production and mitigates the barriers to rms' entry. We then calibrate the model using data of Brazil, a country that have signicantly expanded its infrastructure in recent decades yet remains in deep need for further infrastructure improvements. Accumulation of infrastructure accelerates the process of the structural transformation through eects channeled by cross-sector dierences in public capital intensity and entry costs. Nevertheless, other factors such as public sector mismanagement and higher technological progress in sectors with low public capital intensity reduce the strength of the structural transformation eects of infrastructure.
Introduction
The process of the structural transformation, that is, the reallocation of inputs to more productive activities is recognized as an important feature of successful economic development.
Focusing on the three largest economy sectors, this process is characterized by a reallocation of productive resources from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and later from agriculture and manufacturing into services. 1 In the last few years, another aspect that is acquiring a prominent place in the economic policy agenda is public infrastructure formation. The reason is that public capital is perceived as a key complementary factor to private inputs. Necessary infrastructure includes, for instance, roads, airports, electricity networks, and institutions that favor production over diversion. Nevertheless, our understanding of how these two important processes interact is limited. The goal of this paper is two-fold.
First, it wants to assess the importance of public infrastructure formation in the structural transformation, and vice versa. Second, we want to understand how dierent constraints to public capital accumulation impact infrastructure and the structural transformation.
As a rst approximation to the possible relationship between the two, we can easily observe for example that they are correlated. Manufacturing captures all activity that falls outside of agriculture and services. Finally, the category services refers to the tertiary sector. To achieve our goal, we built a multisectoral general equilibrium model of unbalanced economic growth that is later analyzed quantitatively.
2 In this framework, the three sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services coexist within a closed economy, except for the capital market that is open. They enjoy exogenous sector-specic productivity growth. There are three main actors: rms, households and a government. We deviate from the existing literature by introducing public infrastructure and heterogeneous rms. Public infrastructure is non-rival and increases the productivity of private inputs. In turn, establishments have plant-specic productivity and are free to enter and exit markets. We consider rm heterogeneity because, besides the standard complementarity between public and private capital considered in the literature, public infrastructure in our model also helps reducing xed costs of operation. That is, the lack of sucient public capital acts as a barrier to the 2 The unbalanced growth feature of the model should not be perceived as a caveat. As Herendorf et al.
(2014) argue: [in order to study the structural transformation process] focusing on frameworks that yield exact balanced growth is probably overly restrictive. The literature should instead focus on building models that can quantitatively account for the properties of structural transformation and in the process assess the importance of various economic mechanisms. entry of rms into markets. This feature is motivated, for example, by the observation that xed costs such as legal fees, brides, security and some indivisible equipment depend on the quality of regulatory governance and public utility networks. The size of the xed costs will also contribute to endogenously determine the average productivity level in each industry and aect input reallocation across sectors.
The quantitative analysis takes the Brazilian data as its reference. We choose this country because Brazil is widely considered to be in deep need of further infrastructure investment.
Looking for example at the Global Competitiveness Report 2016-17, Brazil's quality of overall infrastructure stands at 116th place out of 138 nations. Brazil also oers comparable data across sectors on gross value added, employment levels, and size and number of rms. We focus on the post-hyperination period that goes from 1995 to 2013. During that time, the value added shares of agriculture and manufacturing have declined, and the one of services increased. As expected, these patterns are replicated by the sectoral employment shares.
Regarding rm sizes, manufacturing have, on average, the largest rms, followed by services, and agriculture that have the smallest ones. The average establishment size seems to have declined in all sectors from 1995 to 2013.
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Our results indicate that the the accumulation of infrastructure contributes to speed up the process of the structural transformation. More specically, when sectors are complementary, their income share increases with the relative product price. Because services are the least intensive in public capital, the relative price of tertiary products grows faster as infrastructure accumulates, and hence the reallocation of resources towards that sector speeds up. This acceleration eect is reinforced by agriculture because it looks the most intensive in government-provided capital. At the same time, the increasing importance of the least intensive sector that is, services reduces the incentives for public capital formation. On the other hand, the eects that run through the xed costs can have, by construction, only level eects and do not aect the speed of the structural transformation. Interestingly, the impact goes in the other direction, because output prices in the model increase with the relative xed cost that the industry faces. Therefore, since xed costs decline with public capital, additional infrastructure formation induces a smaller share of the industry. Taking the size of the average rm as an indication of the xed costs face, manufacturing that have the largest average rms will have higher xed costs. As a result, public capital will push the value added share of this sector up; whereas by the same token it will tend to decrease the share of agriculture, which is the one with the smallest rms in the Brazilian data. 4 These authors build a neoclassical model of growth in which the income elasticity of demand is less than one for agricultural goods, equal to one for manufacturing goods, and greater than one for services. They are able to generate a balanced growth that is consistent with structural change. The second one is oered by Baumol (1967) An alternative mechanism is proposed by Caselli and Coleman (2001) , who consider that non-agriculture is more skill intensive than agriculture. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) oer an explanation of the structural transformation based on capital accumulation and 4 Similar demand-side channels are presented in Matsuyama (1992) , Echevarria (1997) Our paper is also related to the literature on the eects of public infrastructure. TBC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next section. Section 3 studies a particular case that delivers a balanced-growth path, although without structural transformation. The Brazilian experience is described in section 4. The quantitative analysis and results of the paper are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Environment
We consider a economy with three main actors: households, rms, and the government. There are three production sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services; manufactures are the numeraire. For simplicity, we assume that there is free international movement of capital.
All other markets are closed. Within all production activities, there is free entry and exit of heterogeneous rms. Establishments pay xed costs of entry and operation. If they decide to operate in the market, rms have access to a production technology that employs private capital, labor and public infrastructure. The public input determines factor productivity and aects the xed costs faced by rms. Its nature is non-rival and its eciency can vary across sectors. It is provided by rent-seeking politicians and nanced through lump-sum consumer taxes. The model variables and parameters are described in the technical appendix.
Households
The economy is composed of innitely-lived individuals that show preferences dened over consumption of agricultural goods (c a ), manufacturing products (c m ), and services (c s ). They are endowed with one unit of time that is supplied inelastically as labor in exchange for a salary (w t ). They own equal shares in all rms that provide dividends from prots each period (d t ). The population is a mass of size one and remains constant.
The problem faced by a representative consumer is the following:
where
Subject to the budget constraint
In the above problem, the parameter ε ∈ (0, ∞) represents the elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption, η > 0 is a scaling factor, the coecient ω i represents the weight of sector i in the consumption bundle c t , and ρ is the subjective discount factor.
The prices p at and p st correspond to agricultural products and services, respectively, and are expressed in terms of manufacturing output. The consumer's stock of bonds in period t equals b t , and provides a return given by the interest rate r t minus the depreciation rate of private capital δ k . Each individual pays lump-sum taxes τ t to the government.
The solution to this problem results in the following optimality conditions for consumption:
where the exact CES price of the consumption bundle equals
Equalities (4) and (5) represent the intertemporal and the inter-sector optimality conditions for consumption, respectively. The former denes the growth rate of total consumption expenditure as a function of the return to saving, that is, the interest rate net of depreciation discounted to take into account the time preference. The latter, in turn, says that the share of sector i in total consumption expenditure depends on the weight ω i and the relative price p it /p ct . More specically, if the dierent consumption goods are complementary (i.e., ε ∈ (0, 1)), the consumption share of sector i rises with its relative price; the opposite is true when the goods are relatively substitutes, ε > 1; nally, if ε equals one, the share is constant and equal to its weight in the consumption bundle.
Firms
There is free entry and exit of prot-maximizing rms in all markets. These markets are perfectly competitive. We consider an unlimited number of potential entrants. These entrants have highly idiosyncratic specialization and can operate in one and only one sector during their productive lives. Establishments can generate output in activity i = a, m, s combining labor services l i , private capital k i , and public infrastructure G. The production technology at the rm level displays diminishing returns over private capital and labor. Infrastructure is supplied free of charge by the government, and represents a non-rival good whose stock is used simultaneously by all rms. Total factor productivity depends on a sector specic parameter A i that grows at the exogenous gross rate Z A i and a rm-specic eciency coecient q.
As in Baumol (1967) , and more recently Ngai and Pissarides (2007), sector-biased technical change that is, dierences in the growth rate of A i across sectors will be the source of the structural transformation in our model.
More specically, the amount of output y it (q) produced by a rm that operates in sector i at time t as a function of q is given by the following technology:
where β i represents the intensity with which public capital is used in sector i; whereas e it is an exogenous sector-specic infrastructure-eciency variable. The variable e it captures the appropriateness of public capital for the dierent sectors; it can be related to its type but also its location. For example, relatively low levels of public investment in irrigation systems and lack of proximity of roads and electric networks to rural areas could mean a lower value of e at compared to e mt . This is dierent than the intensity with which irrigation systems are used in agriculture, which is clearly higher than in manufacturing.
Knowing its production function, expression (7), a prot-maximizing rm with eciency q rent capital and labor until input prices are equalized to the value of their marginal productivity. These rst order conditions are given by:
Combining (7), (8) and (9) obtains that all rms will employ the same capital-labor ratios and that labor demand, capital demand and prots are a function of prices, total factor productivity and the infrastructure eciency level:
and
The last equality implies that the amount of prots π it (q) is a fraction 1 − α − γ of total production of a type-q rm in sector i at time t.
Firms build their stocks of physical capital borrowing saving to buy units from manufacturing and services that are combined according to the following CES technology:
where x t represents investment at date t; x it is the amount of sector-i products employed in capital formation; ν is the elasticity of substitution among investment products; and µ i ∈ (0, 1). This technology is based on the observation that over time, due to for instance the increasing importance of software, the service sector has increase very signicantly its contribution to total investment. A consequence of this phenomenon is that, since year 2000, total investment in the US exceeds the size of the whole manufacturing sector. It is straightforward to derive that the optimal demand of investment goods obey the following condition:
where the price of the investment bundle equals
As in the case of the consumption bundle, if the two investment goods are complementary (i.e., ν ∈ (0, 1)), the investment share of sector i goes up with its relative price; the opposite occurs when investment goods are substitutes (i.e., ν > 1); if ν = 1 then the shares are constant.
Establishments are heterogeneous due to the plant-level productivity parameter q. The rm's type is a realization of q drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean µ, standard deviationσ and density function h(q); draws are i.i.d. across entrants. In order to know q in period t, the rm needs to pay an exogenous xed cost F qt . In addition, after knowing their type, rms that want to operate in market i must pay a second sector-specic xed cost F oit that depends on the amount of infrastructure in the economy. In particular,
where the parameters θ, ψ > 0; and K t is the total stock of capital in the economy at t. Variables F qt and F oit are expressed in units of manufacturing output. In addition, F qt implicitly incorporates a premium to cover it for those rms that decide to enter but that eventually, due to a bad draw of q, can not pay it fully after production occurs.
Expressions (17) and (18) oit include any barrier to operation that imposes a cost that rises with the ratio of private to public capital. These costs can be direct, like bribes, lawyers or private security intended to prevent expropriation, or indirect, for example due to power outages that prevent production while they occur. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that rms mutate and every period need to rediscover their type; that is, both costs need to be paid every period after production takes place.
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Free entry means that establishments will enter the market if and only if expected prots are not lower than the up-front costs. This means that, before knowing its type, expected prots net of entry and operation costs in each sector i are reduced to zero. Therefore, the free entry condition can be stated as follows:
In addition, after they know the type, rms will operate in a given period provided that they can obtain positive prots, that is, if q ≥q it , where
From free entry conditions (19), we can write output prices as
Unlike in more standard multisector models with Cobb-Douglas production functions in which output prices are fully pinned down by relative TFP, the price in our framework depends on the variables that aect the relative productivity of private inputs namely, the sectorspecic productivity and the eciency level of infrastructure and on the relative size of xed costs. A relatively less productive industry or a sector that faces higher relative xed costs will charge a higher price.
Taking on-board the last expression, along with conditions (8) and (10), it is also easy to derive the relative labor allocations. Within sectors, labor is allocated exclusively based on the eciency parameter q as follows:
Firms with a larger productivity parameter q will hire more labor and rent more capital.
Across sectors, in turn, the relative labor allocation obeys:
for i = a, s. That is, across industries, the hired amount of labor exclusively varies due to dierences in xed costs; sectors with lower xed costs will have smaller rms on average.
The minimum plant-productivity level that justies operation in sector i can be also easily obtained from (19) and (20) combining the free entry condition in manufacturing and the operation conditions. We obtain to denotê
The expected value of q Finally, the amount of prots that rms are able to obtain can be written as a function of the xed costs and the plant productivity index, because the last two variables determine the rm's size. More specically, equalities (13) to (19) and (24) obtain
Implicitly, expression (25) reminds us that, at the minimum, rms' output must cover the xed costs of operation. It also implies that prots before xed costs depend on the ratio of the plant productivity level to its threshold value. Therefore, in order to cover as well the entry costs F qt and obtain strictly positive net prots, this ratio needs to be suciently larger than one.
2.3
The government
We assume that the public sector is an innitely-lived institution composed of rent-seeking politicians and potentially aected by mismanagement. Their problem is choosing the amounts of rent capture (R t ) and public infrastructure to maximize a welfare function that weighs the present value of consumer's utility and R t . In order to concentrate only on the variables that are under the direct control of the government that is, R t and G t we assume that the government makes decisions taking market allocations of other variables as given.
Because we assume that the government combines manufacturing and service products to build infrastructure in the same manner as the private sector using technology (14) , it is then immediate that its demand for investment goods will also obey function (15) .
Therefore, we can concentrate on the following problem:
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the time-preference coecient; ϕ ≥ 0. A way to justify that only current rents extraction is valued in expression (26) is assuming that politicians stay in oce for one period; alternatively, we can think that politicians believe that their corrupt behavior might not be sustainable in the near future.
Objective function (26) is maximized subject to the economy's feasibility condition:
i=a,m,s (27) where N it represents the number of rms that produce output in sector i; I gt and I kt give investment in public infrastructure and private capital, respectively; and Y it is aggregate output in sector i, given by
Notice that the sum of I gt and I kt must be equal to the available amount of investment x t given by expression (14) . Equality (27) says that total production (i.e., GDP) is allocated to nance the xed costs, consumption, investment, and rent capture. Notice that this expression also represents the government's budget constraint, because it implies that the amount paid by consumers as taxes τ t production minus xed costs minus private investment minus consumption is allocated between public capital formation and rent extraction.
Following Darla-Norris et al. (2002), we consider that the government suers from mismanagement of public investment. In particular, a I gt equal one unit delivers ξ < 1 units of public-capital value (e.g., due to corruption or indolence). As a result, investment I gt serves the maintenance and construction of infrastructure according to the following motion equation:
where the parameter δ g represents the depreciation rate of government infrastructure.
The rst order condition to the government's problem given by expressions (26) to (29) with respect to R t predict that rents are a fraction ϕ of total aggregate consumption:
R t = ϕL t P ct c t .
It gives the optimal evolution of total consumption expenditure from the government's viewpoint. Unlike in expression (4), where the consumer links intertemporal consumption to the return to saving, the policymaker in (31) relates consumption expenditure growth to the marginal return to public capital investment. A return that takes into account that a higher G t+1 will increase private input productivity and reduce rms' xed costs, but that not the whole amount of public investment translate into public capital due to mismanagement.
Putting together (4) and (31), employing as well (7), (8), (28), (9), (19) and (20), obtains
It is equivalent to a non-arbitrage condition: the government invests in public capital until the return is the same as the one provided by the alternative type of investment. In expression (32), it is evident again that the stock of infrastructure G t aects the productivity of all rms in the economy, regardless of their sector, due to its non-rival nature. Thus meaning that the productivity of infrastructure is larger than the one perceived by the individual rm. It is also clear that a lager degree of mismanagement of public funds (a lower ξ) leads to a decrease in public capital formation.
Market clearing
To wrap up the model we need to specify the market clearing conditions. In the labor market, the supply is given by the total population, normalized to one for simplicity, whereas rms' demand is derived from expression (8) . Hence, labor marker clearing requires:
i=a,m,s 
Which can be further disaggregated in
Regarding product markets, we assume that policymakers capture rents from each sector in the same proportion as its share in aggregate consumption expenditure. Market clearing then requires that production is allocated between agents' consumption and rms' xed costs in all sectors, and also to investment in manufacturing and services. We can write these conditions as follows:
and 
Equilibrium
We are focusing on a decentralized economy with public sector intervention that takes as given the interest rate r t from the rest of the world. An equilibrium in this model economy is dened as the value of wages w t , input prices p it , consumption c it , investments x it , private input allocations l it (q) and k it (q), infrastructure provision G t , operation thresholdsq it , number of rms N it , and politicians' rents R t so that, given input and output prices, consumers maximize utility, rms maximize prots, and the government maximizes social welfare, and where prices are the solution to the free entry conditions and market clearing.
A useful transformation to study the dynamics of this economy is writing the capital to labor ratio (10) in terms of aggregate capital as follows:
This permits constructing a solvable equation system that only depends on sectoral variables.
More specically, for a predetermined stock of infrastructure and an interest rate given by the international market, free entry condition (19) for the manufacturing sector along with (38) pinned down the equilibrium wage rate and the stock of private capital. Output prices and plant-productivity thresholds are given by (21) and (24), respectively. Incorporating (5), (6), (15) and (16) into the market clearing conditions allows expressions (33) and (36) deliver expressions for the number of rms in each industry. Finally, motion equations (34) and (29), market clearing in manufacturing (37) and the public-investment optimality condition, expression (32), solve for the optimal consumption and investment patterns.
The above procedure provides all economy-wide and sectoral equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. In addition, these equilibrium values need to be compatible with the optimal path of aggregate consumption suggested by intertemporal condition (4). Rents extracted by politicians can be recovered from (30) . At the rm level, the capital and labor allocations are obtained from equations (10), (11), (22) and (23).
Balanced Growth Without Structural Transformation
The model, in general, does not have a balanced growth path (BGP); not even if we exclusively ask economy-wide variables such as aggregate consumption and the stock of capital to have this feature, allowing the sectoral ones to show a non-constant growth rate. The reason is that, unlike in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) multisector growth model, the production function does not display constant returns over costly inputs (i.e., α + γ < 1). In order to have a BGP, we would need to impose that the price P ct of the consumption bundle grows at a constant rate at steady state. We do not make this assumption because it would constraint the values that could be assigned to the parameters and the capacity of the model to generate reallocations of resources among sectors. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the forces of growth in this particular scenario to have a deeper understanding of the model.
Therefore, let us denote by Z x the gross growth rate of variable x along the BGP, and
, for i = a, s, so that P ct remains constant at steady state.
In this scenario, the economy converges towards a BGP in which the feasibility constraint (27) suggests that the sectoral variables output value, private capital, and prots, the aggregate variables xed costs and consumption, and rents, public infrastructure and investments all grow at the same rate as Y mt . In addition, the denitions of sectoral capital and output expressions (28) and (??) make clear that the individual the rm´s output value and its capital stock will grow at the same rate as y mt in all activities. According to (28) , the dierence between the growth rates of Y mt and y mt will be due to the growth rate of the number of rms, which by expressions (17) and (18) will take on the same number in all
sectors. An important variable that will grow at the same rate as aggregate income per capita is the salary w t .
We know that Z G = Z Ym ; which, using expression (21) that also holds for agriculture in long-run equilibrium, implies that the gross growth rate of output prices equals:
which is equal to one under our assumption. Notice that this suggests that output prices compensate for productivity dierences so that the output revenues grow at the same rate in all sectors at steady state. Equation (39) along with production function (7) and inputs demands (11) and (12) imply that
Next, notice that denition (28) of sectoral output requires that
assuming for simplicity that ψ = 1/(1 − α − γ), both expressions (17) and (18) deliver that
Growth rates Z ym and Z Ym depend on the path of technical change proxied by Z Am . The bottom line is that the growth rate of infrastructure does aect the growth rate of output.
In particular, along the transition, the level of infrastructure plays an important role in the determination of the economic growth rate and the level of income. This is true even though, as expressions (42) imply, the steady-state values of all growth rates are exclusively pinned down by the exogenous rates of population growth and technological change.
Finally, along the BGP, the Euler equation for consumption will give r t . More specically, at steady state, expression (4) delivers that
that is, the interest rate is determined by preferences and the economy's growth rate.
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We assign values to the model parameters so as to reproduce the evolution of sectoral variables in Brazil from 1995 to 2013. We focus on this middle-income Latin American nation because it is widely considered to be in deep need of further infrastructure investment. Looking for example at the Global Competitiveness Report 2016-17, Brazil's quality of overall infrastructure stands at 116th place out of 138 nations, two positions below its 2013-14 ranking.
The quality of its roads is at 111th place, its railroads at 93rd, its ports at 114th, its air transport at 95th, and its electricity supply in 91st. The last gure represents a signicant fall compared to the 76th position achieved in the 2013-14 Report.
In addition, in line with our model, Brazil poor infrastructure status seems to be at least 8 The former variable is supplied by IBGE and the latter by RAIS. We can see that data before 1995 show strange trends. In services, for example, the share of rms drops rapidly during this period, even though its GVA share grows probably too fast.
9 The reason is probably the distortions generated by the strong hyperination suered by Brazil between 1980 and 1994 that reached an annual ination rate close to 3,000%.
As a consequence, we decide to focus on the time interval that starts in 1995 and ends in 2013. During this period, services have experienced an increase from 66.7% to 69.3% in its value added share, manufacturing a fall from 27.5% to 25%, and agriculture has remained relatively constant, moving from 5.8% to 5.7%. The share of rms depicts a similar picture, although now the primary sector also shows a signicant change. In particular, the share of rms in both agriculture and manufacturing has fallen (from 12% to 9% in the former and from 18% to 16% in the latter), and in services has increased from 70% to 76%.
Let us move now to the number of employees. Using data obtained from RAIS, Figure   8 The right chart, in turn, shows that the employment shares at the sectoral level followed relatively closely the evolution of the GVA ones. More specically, the share of agricultural and manufacturing employment went down from 4 to 3% and from 28 to 24% during the same time interval, respectively; whereas the one in services rosed from 68 to 73%. Focusing rst in Figure 4 , the distribution looks log-normal in each of the three sectors, as 10 RAIS collects information only about the formal economy. Information on workers in the informal sector could be also obtained from the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD). We do not follow this approach, however, because PNAD does not oer data on the number of rms. The coecient of variation conrms the information obtained previously from Figure 5 .
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In the right chart of Figure 6 , we see that the most heterogeneous sector in terms of rm size is services. In this sector, we also observe a substantial decline in the degree of heterogeneity from 1995 to 2913. According to Figure 5 , this seems to be a consequence of the increase in the importance of middle size rms. Some reduction in the degree of heterogeneity can be also seen in agriculture. Finally, although manufacturing has experienced a small increase in the coecient of variation from 1996 to 2013, it remains the most homogeneous industry, with a biased towards larger rms.
Main messages:
Quantitative Analyses
This section rst assigns values to the dierent parameters of the model. After that, we generate results from several policy experiments.
Calibration
We choose the interest rate so as to reproduce the average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1995 to 2013 that, according to the Penn World Tables 9.0, has been equal to 3.4% in
Brazil. This implies an interest rate net of depreciation equal to 0.078. The growth rates of 
